

## The Outbreak of the Morean Rebellion and Tepedelenli Ali Pasha\*

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### Abstract

On the one hand, 19th century was a period of reform attempts and movements; and on the other hand, it was a period of revolts and rebellions with which the governors had to deal. In the aforementioned period, the nationalism movement which affected the whole Europe gathered pace and the new state emerged. The Ottoman Empire, too, was affected from this movement. The nations living in the Ottoman territories under Ottoman sovereignty started to demand their independence due to the impact of various reasons and movements. Especially, the nations in the Balkans were impacted from the nationalism movements considerably. For instance, among them, the Serbs rebelled firstly (1804), they attained some privileges with the Treaty of Bucharest, then the Greek Rebellion started, followed by other rebellions.

There are many dependent reasons in the emergence of Greek Rebellion. We can list among them the projection of the influences of Enlightenment Period, the independence struggle of USA, the impact of French Revolution. All these improved the intellectual and economic world of Greeks. Also, we have to add the propaganda of European states to these effects. All these intellectual developments, and provocations led Greeks to be ready for the independence movement. But, for the rebellion they expected proper setting and sign. This proper setting came out of the rebellion by Ioannina Pasha Tepedelenli Ali Pasha in 1820. The strict inspection of Ali Pasha who set

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up a suppressive government in the region and on the Greeks disappeared after his rebellion. This problem of the state eased the Greeks' endeavor who have been on preparation for the uprising. Even, there have been some trials between Greeks and Ali Pasha for collaboration. This paper will analyze the impact of Ali Pasha on the emergence of Morean Revolution and the general situation during the rebellion.

**Keywords:** Morean, Rebellion, Tepedelenli Ali Pasha, Ottoman, Greeks.

## Mora İsyânının Çıkışı ve Tepedelenli Ali Pařa

### Öz

19. yüzyıl Osmanlı Devleti'nde yenileşme hareketleri ve çabalarının olduđu bir dönem olduđu gibi yöneticilerin uğraşmak zorunda kaldığı isyanların da çıktığı bir zaman dilimidir. Söz konusu dönemde bütün Avrupa'yı etkileyen ve imparatorlukların çekindiđi milliyetçilik akımı hız kazanmış ve yeni devlet ortaya çıkmıştır. Osmanlı Devleti de milliyetçilik akımından etkilenmiştir. Osmanlı topraklarında ve idaresi altında yaşayan milletler, çeşitli sebepler ve akımların da etkisiyle bağımsızlıklarını istemeye başlamıştır. Özellikle Balkanlardaki milletler milliyetçilik akımından büyük ölçüde etkilenmiştir. Örneđin bunlardan önce Sırlar ayaklanmış (1804), Bükreş Antlaşması'yla bazı ayrıcalıklar elde etmişler, arkasından Yunan İsyânı çıkmış, daha sonra da diđerleri takip etmiştir.

Yunan İsyânı'nın çıkmasında birbiriyle bağlantılı birçok farklı sebep vardır. Bunlar arasında Aydınlanma Çađı denilen dönemin etkilerinin yansımaları, Amerikan bağımsızlık mücadelesi, Fransız İhtilali'nin etkilerini sıralayabiliriz. Bütün bu etkilerle Rumların fikirsel ve ekonomik dünyaları gelişmiştir. Ayrıca Avrupa devletlerinin propagandalarını da bu etkilere eklememiz gerekir. Bütün fikri gelişmeler, kıskırtmalar Rumların bağımsızlık hareketine hazır hale gelmesine neden olmuştur. Ayaklanma için ise uygun ortam ve işaret beklenmektedir. İşte bu uygun ortam 1820 yılında Yanya Pařası Tepedelenli Ali Pařa'nın isyanı ile ortaya çıkmıştır. Bölgede ve Rumlar üzerinde sıkı bir idare kurmuş olan Ali Pařa'nın denetimi, onun isyanıyla ortadan kalkacaktır. Devletin bu sorunla uğraşması zaten isyan için hazırlık yapmakta olan Rumların işini kolaylaştıracaktır. Hatta Rumlarla Ali Pařa arasında iş birliđi sağlama çalışmaları da söz konusu olacaktır. Bu çalışmada Ali Pařa'nın Mora İsyânı'nın çıkışındaki etkisi ve isyan sırasındaki durum ele alınıp incelenecektir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Mora, İsyân, Tepedelenli Ali Pařa, Osmanlı, Rumlar.

## The Outbreak of the Morean Rebellion and Tepedelenli Ali Pasha

The Greeks were a community which achieved the most privileged position in the Ottoman State. They gradually became rich through trade in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere. This wealthy group became influential in the emergence of a Greek national consciousness. They increased opportunities for the Greek youth by building schools, establishing libraries and providing scholarships<sup>1</sup>. Indeed, the Greek national consciousness had started in the 15th century especially with the publication and spread of Hellenist ideas by Plethon Gemistos, publication of a Hellenic Grammar by Konstandinos Laskaris in Milano and other studies about the Greeks. In the 18th century, such publications and translations increased in number, and in the 19th century, their numbers increased much more<sup>2</sup>.

The ideas spread by the French Revolution became influential in the Ottoman State and spread among the Greeks. Especially, the spread of the nationalist ideas among the non-Muslims placed the Ottoman State into the disintegration process. The Mamluks in Egypt and in 1805 the Serbs revolted. The Morean Rebellion started in 1821<sup>3</sup>.

The Greeks started to organize in 1814. The same year, an organization named *Philike Hetaireia* – The Friends Association was established. There were people from all walks of life among the members. Firstly, people wanted Kapodistrias to become the leader of the association, however he declined the offer and Alexander Ypsilantis became the leader<sup>4</sup>.

The first movement was initiated in Moldavia and Wallachia in March of 1821. Alexander Ypsilantis thought that he could get the Serbs on his side. For this reason, he entered Wallachia with his soldiers. However, the rebellion unsuccessfully ended and Ypsilantis had to flee<sup>5</sup>. Actually the

1 S. Şükrü Gürel, *Tarihsel Boyut İçinde Türk-Yunan İlişkileri (1821-1993)*, İmge Kitabevi Yay., Ankara 1993, p. 25.

2 Herkül Millas, *Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu*, İletişim Yay., İstanbul 1994, pp. 48-53.

3 Zeki Arıkan, "1821 Yunan İsyanı'nın Başlangıcı", *Askeri Tarih Bülteni*, Year 12, No. 22, February 1987, p. 97.

4 Yücel Özkaya, "1821 Yunan (Eflak-Boğdan) İsyanları ve Avrupalıların İsyan Karşısındaki Tutumları", *IV. Askeri Tarih Semineri, Türk-Yunan İlişkileri*, Ankara 1986, pp. 114-115; Gürel, *ibid.*, pp. 27-28, Ahmet Cevdet, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, Vol. 11, p. 8; Stanford J. Shaw-Ezel Kural Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye*, Vol. 2, İstanbul 1983, p. 44.

5 For more information regarding this attempt performed in Moldavia and Wallachia, see:

rebellion was planned to start in April. However, firing performed by two drunks wandering in the marketplace in the town of Argos prompted the Greeks, who had been already preparing for a revolt, and the incident took place on March 17, 1821 (12 Cemazie'l-ahir 36)<sup>6</sup>. This movement spread to the entire Morea and the islands in a short amount of time<sup>7</sup>. As it is known, when the Morean Rebellion started, the Ottoman State was busy with handling the Tepedelenli Ali Pasha rebellion in Ioannina (*Yanya*). In this study, the relationship between the Tepedelenli Ali Pasha rebellion and the rebellion in the Morea will be analyzed.

Ali Pasha established a strong administration in Albania and Greece. We know that most of the significant Greek military leaders in the war of independence were *Armatoloi* assigned to serve under Ali Pasha and they were well trained. Among them, we can mention names such as Androutsos, Karaiskakis, Diakos, Tsansas, and Bakolas<sup>8</sup>. According to what Dennis Skiotis narrates from Arabantinos, while the permanent troops of Ali Pasha consisted of Muslim Albanians, most of the persons assigned for security in the provinces were Christian *Armatoloi*<sup>9</sup>. Ali Pasha also helped in the development of the nationalist thoughts of the Greeks, namely he was having churches built, using Greece in diplomatic correspondence, and encouraging education in Greek. Ali Pasha was also using Greek Bishops as spies. Majority of the Orthodox Greeks were under the administration of Ali Pasha. The Pasha was benefitting from the skills of the Greeks. Ioannina was regarded as a Greek city<sup>10</sup>.

Alexander Ypsilantis and Kapodistria met in summer of 1820. Ypsilantis would get recommendations from Kapodistria regarding what the Greeks'

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Özkaya, *ibid*, pp. 114-132.

6 Ahmet Cevdet, *ibid*, Vol. 11, p. 146.

7 Regarding the Morean Rebellion and the situation in the islands, see: Mübahat Kütükoğlu, "Yunan İsyanı Sırasında Anadolu ve Adalar Rumlarının Tutumları ve Sonuçları", *3. Askeri Tarih Semineri, Türk-Yunan İlişkileri*, Ankara 1986, pp. 133-161; Zeki Arıkan, "1821 Ayvalık İsyanı", *Belleten*, Vol. LII, No. 203, August 1988, pp. 571-601.

8 Dennis N. Skiotis, "Mountain Warriors and the Greek Revolution", *War Technology and Society in the Middle East*, London 1975, p. 316.

9 Skiotis, *ibid*, p. 317.

10 William Miller, *The Ottoman Empire*. . . , p. 64; Nevill Forbess, Arnold Joseph Toynbee, David Mitrany, David George Hogarth, *The Balkans a History of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Rumania, Turkey*, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1915, p. 189.

position would be in the conflict that arose between the Ottoman State and Ali Pasha. Although Kapodistria was not siding with the revolution, he was of the opinion that the Greeks would benefit from this situation regarding Ali Pasha. He believed that the soldiers needed to be prepared to defend themselves when needed<sup>11</sup>. When the Ottoman troops moved against Ali Pasha, he turned to the Greeks. He already knew the existence of *Philike Hetaireia* since 1818. He thought to use the Greeks for his benefit. He knew that he would also get the support of the Russians. The meetings between Ali Pasha and Ioannis Paparregopovlos, the official translator of the Russian Consul in Patras, were made in April of 1820. According to what is narrated from *Terkopy's History* in *Tarih-i Cevdet*, it is argued that Ali Pasha invited Paparregopovlos to Preveza to meet, however Paparregopovlos did not accept the offer. Paparregopovlos told the situation to the Bishop of Badra and the Bishop was not happy about the situation and told Paparregopovlos to benefit from the situation and convinced him to accept Ali Pasha's offer to have a meeting<sup>12</sup>. The Bishop pressured him so that the Russians would declare war against the Sultan. By saying that his own interests and the interests of the Russians and Greeks converged, he told him to go to St. Petersburg and tell the situation to Kapodistria. Ali Pasha convinced Paparregopovlos regarding his loyalty to Russia. In terms of the meeting with the Pasha and Paparregopovlos, Dimitri, the clerk of Veli Pasha, provided similar information in a letter that he wrote regarding the Greek Rebellion while he was arrested in the Patriarchate in İstanbul<sup>13</sup>.

11 Skiotis, *ibid*, p. 321. For Alexander Ypsilantis's activities, initiation of the events and becoming unsuccessful, see: Anton Freiherrn von Prokesch-Osten, *Geschichte des Abfalls der Griechen vom Türkischen Reiche im Jahre 1821 und der Gründung des Hellenischen Königreiches, Aus Diplomatiscen Standpunkte*, Vol. 2, Wien 1867, pp. 23-82.

12 Ahmet Cevdet, *ibid*, Vol. 11, p. 100, In the *History* of Lütüfi, it is narrated that the members of the organization sent Paparregopovlos to Ali Pasha, and he gave the news that Russia would declare war against the Ottoman State to help Ali Pasha and they wanted Ali Pasha to face the situation. Ahmet Lütüfi, *Tarih-i Lütüfi*, Vol. 1, İstanbul 1290, p. 14.

13 BOA, Royal Edict, no: 48908-A. According to that information, both Ali Pasha and the Russians would struggle for Ali Pasha's forgiveness and within a year Ali Pasha would unite the people under his rule, get more ammunition and revolt. And if Russia worked for starting a revolution in the Ottoman lands, the Ottoman State would not find a solution for this problem. They decided to start a big rebellion everywhere at the same time. Later, Paparregopovlos came to İstanbul and let the Russian Ambassador to know about this meeting and later went to St. Petersburg. Austria heard about this incident and contacted Ali Pasha and asked him why he was in contact with the Russians, and made a claim on Albania and offered him to

It is understood that the Pasha wanted to act with the Russians, improve his situation and revolt again. Although Paparregopovlos accepted this, the trip was postponed. Both communicated with the military leaders and bishops in Morea and Rumelia and warned them to be ready during a possible general uprising. Although Ali Pasha contacted Great Britain and Austria and struggled for achieving Sultan's forgiveness, he saw that his only salvation would be realized by the Russian-Greek plan. According to what Hugues Pouqueville tells, Ali Pasha was making the propaganda of the big event in December to achieve loyalty of his men until March. In the meantime, the *Armatoloi* under the service of Ali Pasha started resisting against the Ottoman forces which were moving further into Rumelia. At the same time, calls were made to the fighters who escaped to the Seven Islands to return to their homeland and unite with the *Armatoloi*. Those aforementioned fighters were the Klepht and Sulis. They were also receiving promises of pardon and good wages from the Ottomans. Due to those offers coming from both sides, those who escaped to the islands came back. They initially chose Ali Pasha's side because Ali Pasha was with the Greek cause. However, the indecisiveness of Ali Pasha in entering into the war, his known double dealing and greed upset the Greek leaders. When the Ottoman soldiers captured significant places in Rumelia due to those reasons, the *Armatoloi* and some Greek chiefs, who were with Ali Pasha, switched to Ottomans' side<sup>14</sup>. The Ottoman soldiers who sieged Ioannina lost their initial speed. The number of the Ottoman Army which was 50 thousand at the beginning fell to four fifth of it. The foreign observers analyzing the situation reported that jealousy and separations started among the pashas in the Ottoman camp. Moreover, the peasantry switched to the Greeks' side due to reasons such as the Ottomans' pressuring the peasantry, forcefully taking materials from them such as money, food and animal feed, and forcing them for angry. The situation in the Balkans became unbearable for the people. Also, the observers notified that the soldiers who were sent to the Balkans because of Ali Pasha harassed people and the region was in a desolate situation. In this situation, the people started revolting in masses by seizing the opportunity. Firstly, the Sulyots sided with Ali Pasha. The real purpose of the Sulyots was

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work with Austria. Ali Pasha also made a deal with the Austrians because he perceived the Austrian help important. Dimitri notified that information to the authorities and he also indicated that he might also confront the ambassadors.

14 Skiotis, *ibid*, pp. 324-325.

not to lose their homeland from where they were forced out 17 years ago<sup>15</sup>. Thusly, the Sulyots revolted against the Sultan. The Albanians were also tired of the attitudes of the Ottoman troops. They have had a privileged status in Rumelia for about 30 years under the rule of Ali Pasha. The only solution for them was to unite their forces with the Sulyots. An agreement was signed on the date of January 27, 1821. The Albanians and Sulyots would “become a single spirit in a body” and “shed their blood for the decisive victory of Ali Pasha”. Almost all of the Klepht and other tribes and the peasantry of the mountainous areas would start actions against the Ottomans. Although the Ottomans worked against preventing this rebellious spirit, they were too late for that<sup>16</sup>.

Another Greek group which prepared for action around this date was the captains of the *Armatoloi*. Just like the Sulyots and the Klepht, they were related with the Korfu Committee of the *Philike Hetaireia*. The most well-known captains among them such as Androutsos, Varnakiotis, Tsargas, Stournaris and Makris met on the Santa Mavra Island in the beginning of January, 1821. Those persons may be characterized as the military organizers of the Greek movement. Those people who convened decided to follow up the leaders of Epir and spread the rebellion in Rumelia<sup>17</sup>. Elias Mavramichalis, son of ruler of Mani (*Manya*) in the Morea also attended this meeting. As it may be understood, some local movements started. The central committee of *Philike Hetaireia* in İstanbul and Ypsilantis, the leader of the organization in southern Russia, reacted when they received the news about those events. Because the revolution would start by the arrival of Ypsilantis. Nevertheless, the events started. The representative of Ypsilantis in the Morea was warning Ypsilantis and telling him that he would not guarantee any delays anymore, namely he would not be able to prevent the events until he came<sup>18</sup>.

Ali Pasha got news from his spies on 23 March that everything was going according to the plan. The Greeks were saying that they would not be separated from Ali Pasha whether they were alive or dead<sup>19</sup>. The rebellion started at the end of March and became widespread in April in the Morea.

15 The homeland of the Sulyots is the lands around the Suli Mountain in central Albania as we have mentioned earlier. H. N., Brailsford, *Macedonia Its Races and their Future*, New York 1971, pp. 125-126.

16 Skiotis, *ibid*, p. 326.

17 Skiotis, *ibid*, p. 327.

18 Skiotis, *ibid*, pp. 327-328.

19 Skiotis, *ibid*, p. 328.

After quelling the rebellion in Moldavia and Wallachia, it was necessary to quell the rebellion in the Morea. Hurşit Pasha sent Mehmet Pasha to the Morea and in April Hasan Pasha was announced as the guardian of Nafplio (Anadolu). As Mehmet Pasha went to the Morea, the Government asked Hurşit Pasha's opinion regarding it would be appropriate to send Hasan Pasha, who was the guardian of Nafplio whether to Nafplio or the Morea. Upon this, Hurşit Ahmet Pasha suggested Hasan Pasha should go to Nafplio, communicate with Mehmet Pasha and send troops to the regions of Derventa and Tripolitsa. And the Ottoman Government acted upon this suggestion. Although soldiers who were taken from the provinces of Aydın and Saruhan for protecting Nafplio by ships from İzmir upon the suggestion of Hurşit Pasha, the soldiers remained off of Yenikale because many bandit ships were wandering in the Mediterranean. This situation prevented Hasan Pasha's arrival to Nafplio, and thusly Hasan Pasha was appointed as the guardian of İzmir<sup>20</sup>. Hurşit Pasha's suggestion was taken into consideration and Mehmet Pasha was appointed as the governor of the Morea. We know that many ships and soldiers were prepared to be sent to the Morea in July. Previously, 70 ships were sent to the Morea. Other than those, 120 ships that belonged to Mehmet Ali Pasha, the governor of Egypt, were going to the Morea. Additionally, roughly about 130-140 vessels, which were gathered from Algeria, Tunisia and other locations, were about to reach the Morea. And representatives such as Behram Pasha and Hacı Bekir Pasha, the Governor of Karaman, were assigned to go to the Morea over the land through Yenişehir with roughly about 50-60 thousand soldiers with them. Also, Mustafa Pasha, the Governor of Alexandria, was also going to the Morea through Nafpaktos and Karli-Eli. The number of soldiers that were sent to the Morea was roughly around 130-140 thousand<sup>21</sup>.

As it is known, during those dates, the Tepedelenli Ali Pasha rebellion had to be dealt with as the rebellion was not quelled yet. We learn from the sources that Ali Pasha's men were among the Greek rebels<sup>22</sup>.

*Philike Hetaireia* was preparing various written statements before the beginning of the incident regarding their course of action. In the 2nd, 4th and 5th articles of one of those statements, there were considerations regarding the Tepedelenli Ali Pasha incident:

20 BOA, Property Record - 610, p. 59, 61, 67.

21 BOA, Cevdet - Dahiliye, no: 9409(28). Letter of Mehmet Pasha, the governor of the Morea dated 12 July 1821 (11 L 236), Ataullah Şanizade, *Tarih-i Şanizade*, Vol. 4, p. 178.

22 Ahmet Cevdet, *ibid*, Vol. 11, pp. 101-102.



According to the 2nd Article, if Tepedelenli Ali Pasha was able to withstand the Ottoman forces until the rebellion of the Serbs, the Ottoman State would divide its forces in two due to the Serbian and Ali Pasha incidents and thusly the Morean people would continue their rebellion easily. Even if Ali Pasha was defeated by the Ottoman forces, the Ottomans would not be able to empower the Greek captains as the larger portion of the Ottoman forces would be sent over to the Serbs. And in the event that the captains were defeated, an important Greek force would be destroyed, so the Serbs' continuance to the war would be provided in order to prevent the captains to be defeated by the Ottomans.

According to the 4th Article, a special representative would be sent to the captains under the protection of Ali Pasha and an attempt would be made to join the organization [*Philike Hetaireia*].

According to the 5th Article, if this representative was able to arrive Ioannina before Ali Pasha's defeat, he would attempt to set out an agreement between Ali Pasha and the captains for unity and cooperation between them<sup>23</sup>.

In a letter sent by Paparregopovlos to the General Inspector (*Nazır-ı Umumi*) dated September 20, 1820, it was expressed that issuance of a guilty edict for Tepedelenli Ali Pasha as he revolted against the Ottoman State would be an opportunity which should not be missed<sup>24</sup>.

We see that the Greeks used Ali Pasha for their own purposes, the General Inspector sent an ordinance to the captains in company with Tepedelenli Ali Pasha on the date of December 12, 1821 (29 Kanun-i Sani 1821). In the 2nd Article of this ordinance the captains were asked to maintain their alliance with Ali Pasha, after they push the Ottoman soldiers from the region, Ali Pasha would be in their hands, and they were asked not to bring Ali Pasha to his former condition. In the 4th Article, it was notified that they needed to pay special attention to removing the Muslim population from the region with the justification to protect Ali Pasha without following any orders of the Ottoman State, and in the 5th Article, it was notified that the recommendation letters sent by the Patriarchate to encourage the captains to ally with the Ottoman soldiers and struggle for punishing Ali Pasha were obtained by force, and they needed not to obey those recommendations<sup>25</sup>. As

23 Mehmet, *Rum Fetretine Dair Tarih*, Vol. I, İstanbul 1288, pp. 21-22.

24 Ahmet Cevdet, *ibid*, Vol. 11, p. 241.

25 Ahmet Cevdet, *ibid*, Vol. 11, pp. 256-257.

it is understood from those, Ali Pasha would be used against the Ottoman State, and thusly the Ottoman soldiers would be pushed out of the region and later the weakened Ali Pasha would be in the hands of the Greeks.

It was clear that the Russians also had an influence on the rebellious incidents in the region. It is known that *Philike Hetaireia* was supported by the Russians. In his letter that he wrote to İstanbul on August 23, 1821 (23 Za 236) Hurşit Ahmet Pasha mentioned the Russians and the Greeks while he was describing the events in Ioannina. Hurşit Ahmet Pasha stated that he got the news regarding the Russian envoy's departure from İstanbul and claimed that this gave him the impression that Russia would declare war against the Ottoman State. The Pasha indicated that there was a Russian provocation in the Greek rebellion, and that he was of the opinion that France and Austria would assist the Greeks for the rebellion. It was heard that Russia brought its navy to the Baltic Sea and sent it to the Mediterranean from there; and the rumors that Russia would land 60-70 thousand troops to Karli-Eli spread among the public and the incidents started to happen<sup>26</sup>.

We know that Tepedelenli Ali Pasha sent his men to the Morea and provoked the Greeks. The Pasha often made this to be able to save himself. He placed his men into the Ottoman Army. For instance, Ali Pasha sent an Albanian named Olise, who was one of the Greek company commanders, to İsmail Pasha as if he ran away from him. İsmail Pasha trusted Olise. However, he secretly attempted to incite dissension among the Albanian soldiers. In a similar manner, Ali Pasha sent his men to Wallachia and other places<sup>27</sup>. He also performed similar actions in regards to the Morea. In this matter, the Morean Governor Salih Agha wrote a letter to Hurşit Pasha on the date of March 18, 1821. In his letter, Salih Agha stated that Ali Pasha's men were provoking people and asked Hurşit Pasha to send 500-600 soldiers to him. Salih Agha was told that about 1500 soldiers were sent there and when this was heard, the provocations among the people stopped, however it was explained in the letter that there were certainly divisions among the people<sup>28</sup>. In another letter with the same date, the Morean Governor Salih Agha defended Petru Bey, who was the leader of Mani. Salih Agha indicated that he was an official who was powerful, and loyal to the Ottoman State<sup>29</sup>.

26 BOA, Royal Edict, no: 38279.

27 Ataullah Şanizade, *ibid*, Vol. 3, p. 142.

28 BOA, Royal Edict, no: 38276-F.

29 BOA, Royal Edict, no: 38276-C.

However, we know that the leader of Mani was in contact with *Philike Hetaireia*. It is understood that Salih Agha actually did not understand the incidents in the Morea, believed in what was said to him and he was thusly convinced. Due to the turmoil among the public in the Morea, the people of Tripolitsa requested soldiers from Hurşit Pasha. Hurşit Pasha came to the Morea and while he was about to go to Ioannina from there, people assumed that soldiers were sent there for them and evidence of revolution started to be seen in the Morea. Upon this incident, the notables of Tripolitsa convened and stated that they were against the rumors of revolution and Ali Pasha was spreading those rumors<sup>30</sup>. Hurşit Pasha got the news that Ali Pasha's men were inciting dissension in Mani and the Russians sent money to the leader of Mani to prepare soldiers. Certain mischievous people joined the incidents on behalf of Ali Pasha. To remedy the situation, soldiers were sent to Mani immediately. However, Hurşit Pasha notified that this was not enough and thusly a few more ships needed to scout around Mani and siege the city. Hurşit Pasha was of the opinion that the incidents in the Morea was nothing but a result of other states' and especially Ali Pasha's provocation. He believed that it would be sufficient to send a few ships to Mani<sup>31</sup>. The Sultan indicated that he had received information regarding the provocations both from the İbrail guard and other sources. Thusly, the Sultan believed that sending 4-5 ships would not be sufficient in remedying this situation and he asked the Captain Pasha to make preparations for sailing into the Mediterranean. Also the Sultan requested to keep the son of the leader of Mani, clerk of Veli Pasha and the priests under arrest and to increase security measures in places such as Galata and Beyoğlu<sup>32</sup>. The Ottoman rulers were taking measures against Ali Pasha's provocations by sending orders. Separate letters were sent to the guards along the Danube and the Voivode of Moldavia warning them against the men and letters of Ali Pasha to incite people and they were asked to inspect and capture such men and letters and send them to İstanbul<sup>33</sup>. It is also seen that the statesmen were unaware of the Ali Pasha incident and the Morean Rebellion. When Dimitri, the clerk of Veli Pasha, was asked about what he knew regarding the Morean Rebellion, the things that he told were

30 Ahmet Cevdet, *ibid*, Vol. 11, pp. 51-52.

31 BOA, Royal Edict, no: 38866, Letter dated 6 March 1821 (*gurre-i C 36*).

32 BOA, Royal Edict-38866, Edict written by the Sultan for Hurşit Pasha's letter.

33 BOA, Royal Edict-40651-A, Submission dated 30 June 1820 (19 N 235) signed by Mihâl Abde.

interesting. When he attempted to reach the Captain Pasha and the Police Chief (*Bostancıbaşı*) to tell what he knew, he was unable to do so. Finally, he was able to meet Yusuf Agah Efendi, and warned him twice regarding the provocations in the Morea and taking necessary measures against it. In his second warning, Yusuf Agah Efendi smilingly said to Dimitri: *We will often see such provocations, but I hope Ali Pasha resists forty more days. Later, those who cause this situation, will get what they deserve. The sons of Ali Pasha made a very bad thing by leaving their father and escaping. The father and sons needed to face the situation together. Last year, I heard the news about them facing the situation in their locality and the officers attacking them. But, I stated that it would be appropriate to send Mahmut Pasha, the governor of Trikala (Tırhala), for protecting the Morea because our puissant Lord [the Sultan] sent a royal edict to the government office for the Morean affairs and asked me to provide my opinion about the precautions to be taken in the Morea, and the government found it appropriate to have one of the viziers in Ioannina to be the protector of Nis (Niş). I also wanted Mahmut Pasha to leave Ioannina to become the protector of the Morea, as two viziers leave Ioannina, Ali Pasha and his soldiers would understand that they would be necessary in the event that an incident takes place in the Morea and Nis, and by saying that the provocations started to appear, they understood that facing the situation became necessary. However, our puissant Lord did not provide his royal approval for the appointment of Mahmut Pasha in the Morea and appointed another vizier from Anatolia. If Ali Pasha faces the situation for forty days, we will see what punishment will be given to four men here in a month. When I asked who those four men were, he said they are Halet Efendi and the chief barber and together with him the former customs directors Osman Agha and Ahmet Agha. As a response, Dimitri stated that those persons were loyal officers of the Ottoman State and the Sultan also knew them as loyal and he thought that there would not be any punishment for them. In return, Yusuf Agah Efendi said: *If our puissant Lord does not do anything to them, something will happen to them for a different reason because there is another thought among the public and this thought spreads like fire, as if it will almost reach to the women's public bath [everywhere] and these days this thought spreads as it is supposed to spread.* When he heard those words, Dimitri became very surprised. He thought that people did not know the extent of Ali Pasha's treachery<sup>34</sup>. It appears that the internal struggles among the statesmen prompted or prolonged the Ali Pasha incident and prevented*

34 BOA, Royal Edict, No: 48908-A.

them from evaluating and getting the necessary measures sufficiently for the Morean Rebellion.

## Conclusion

Many sources relate the emergence of the Morean Rebellion to Tepedelenli Ali Pasha. Those sources state that Tepedelenli Ali Pasha was keeping the Greeks under pressure and the Greeks were scared to revolt because they were afraid of Ali Pasha. This opinion is somewhat right. Tepedelenli Ali Pasha was a powerful ruler in the region and he intimidated the Greek population. The Greeks took the opportunity because an edict was issued against Ali Pasha for rebelling against the Ottoman State. However, as we have explained above, there had already been previous developments in this regard for quite some time. The ideas of freedom and independence spread among the Greeks. Among the Greeks, those who were well educated, and well-to-do merchants prepared the rebellion in terms of the ideational bases. Moreover, as it is known, in the previous sections, we have also mentioned that the Russians and French made propaganda in this region. The Greeks previously started to get organized with the establishment of *Philike Hetaireia* in 1814. Ali Pasha became aware of this organization and warned the Ottoman State<sup>35</sup>. However, Ali Pasha's announcement as a rebel became a good opportunity for the Greeks to revolt, and they benefitted from the Ottoman State's busying itself with the Ali Pasha incident. While Ali Pasha was seeking an exit for himself, he applied to the Greeks. The *Hetaireia* organization also benefitted from Ali Pasha. With secret codes among them, they used the phrase "father in law" for Tepedelenli Ali Pasha and the number of "30" for Ioannina<sup>36</sup>. The thing that may be said for this situation is the fact that besides the Greeks' success in using the Ali Pasha incident for themselves as a good opportunity, Ali Pasha was of the opinion to apply and use the Greeks to save himself. While the Greeks used this incident and obtain good results for themselves, Ali Pasha was unable to save himself, and a new problem emerged for the Ottoman State. And this caused the spread of the Morean Rebellion and consequently the establishment of the Greek State.

35 Ahmet Lütfi, *ibid.*, Vol. 1, İstanbul, 1290, pp. 14-15. The Morean Greeks secretly sent representatives to the Congress of Vienna, and made some attempts in favor of the Greek Revolution. When Ali Pasha became aware of it, he sent his doctor named Luka, who was a Greek, to Vienna and through his doctor, he received information regarding their attempts and obtained some documents. He learned that the Greeks were preparing for a revolution and he notified this information to the Ottoman Government.

36 Ahmet Cevdet, *ibid.*, Vol. 11, p. 233.

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