

Greeks Atrocities in the Villages of Sivrihisar and Observations of American Missionaries*

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Abstract

The destruction committed by the Greeks after the victory of Sakarya, an important breaking point of the National Struggle for the Turks, prepared the ground for poverty and desperation that the people of Anatolia would strive to repair for the coming years. The Government of Ankara wanted to bring this destruction to the attention of the world public opinion and use it as an advantage in diplomacy. The main challenge was the failure to create the desired impact in the international public opinion because at the time the Turkish authorities were witnessing the damage. The foreign press mostly ignored the destruction caused by the Greeks in Anatolia and prepared unreal reports and skewed the facts by claiming that Turks committed violence against the Greeks.

On the other hand, the Ankara Government did not prevent the activities of missionaries operating in foreign educational and charity institutions of the United States, which were active in Anatolia, during the Turkish National War and the missionaries were even able to travel freely in the territory controlled by the Ankara Government. The study focuses on two important names at this point. The first of them is Annie Allen and the other one is Florence Billings. Those two persons, who were Protestant missionaries, had traveled in Anatolia since the end of the Ottoman Empire and performed activities with humanistic feelings in the name of *“spreading the light of Protestantism”*. The

* Part of the data of this study is taken from the article of the author published with the title of “Yunan Tahribatına Amerikalı Misyonerlerin Bakışı ve Bir Raporun Arka Planı”. See. Ü. Gülsüm Polat, “Yunan Tahribatına Amerikalı Misyonerlerin Bakışı ve Bir Raporun Arka Planı”, *Gazi Akademik Bakış*, Vol 5, Issue 10, 2012, pp. 71-96.

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DOI:10.37879/9789751758866.2024.655

Ankara Government did not limit the mobilization of American missionaries in Anatolia, and the connection of those two missionaries, who were citizens of an impartial country, with persons like Halide Edip dating back to the days of Robert College allowed them to observe and report the destruction to the world public opinion. In their report, titled “*Atrocities in Anatolia*”, those missionaries reported the cruelties they encountered in eight villages of Sivrihisar. The committee observing the villages named Mülk, Oğlakçı, Hamamkarahisar, Kozağaç (today’s Günyüzü), Gecek, Koçaş, Babadad, and Demirci discussed in detail the number of households of those villages and of the houses destroyed by the Greeks. This study is going to evaluate the report, and the relations and connections in the background of the report and consequently seek to draw a panorama of the destruction caused by the Greeks in Anatolia during the years of the Turkish National War.

Keywords: Greek Atrocities, Turkish National War, American Missionaries, Sivrihisar.

Sivrihisar’ın Köylerinde Yunan Tahribatı ve Amerikalı Misyonerlerin Gözlemleri

Öz

Milli Mücadele’nin önemli bir kırılma anı olan Sakarya zaferi sonrası Yunan ordularının geride bıraktığı sistematik tahribat, Anadolu halkının yıllarca onarmak için çaba harcayacağı bir fakirlik ve yokluğa da zemin hazırlamıştır. Ankara Hükümeti bu tahribatı dünya kamuoyunun dikkatine sunmak ve diplomasi alanında bir etki faktörü olarak kullanmak istemiştir. Bununla ilgili en temel zorluk, söz konusu zarar-ziyanın Türk yetkililer tarafından gözlemleniyor olması nedeniyle uluslararası kamuoyunda istenilen etkinin yaratılamaması olmuştur. Yabancı basın Anadolu’daki Yunan tahribatını çoğunlukla görmezden gelerek Rumlara yönelik şiddet olduğuna dair haberler geçerek gerçekleri saptırmıştır.

Diğer taraftan Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin Anadolu coğrafyasında etkin olan yabancı eğitim ve hayır kurumlarında faaliyet gösteren misyonerlerinin Anadolu’daki faaliyetleri Milli Mücadele sürerken de engellenmemiş dahası Ankara Hükümeti’nin kontrolündeki coğrafyada hareket alanları kısıtlanmamış ve seyahat edebilmişlerdir. Bu noktada iki önemli isim bu çalışmada üzerinde durulmak istenen isimlerdir. Bunlardan ilki Annie Allen diğeri ise Florence Billings’dır. Protestan misyonerler olan bu iki isim Osmanlı İmpa-

ratorluğunun son dönemlerinden itibaren bu coğrafyada seyahat etmişler ve “Protestanlığın ışığını yaymak” gibi hümanist duygularla faaliyet göstermişlerdir. Anadolu’daki Amerikan misyonerlerinin mobilizasyonu kısıtlanmadığı gibi Halide Edip gibi isimlerin bu iki misyonerle olan savaş öncesine dayanan Robert College bağlantısı Anadolu’daki tahribatı dünya kamuoyuna bir rapor olarak tarafsız ülke vatandaşı olan bu iki ismin gözlemleme ve sunmalarına olanak sağlamıştır. *Atrocities in Anatolia* başlığı taşıyan bu raporda Sivrihisar’ın 8 köyünde yaşanan mezalim köy köy gözlemlenerek kaleme alınmıştır. Mülk, Oğlakçı, Hamamkarahisar, Kozağaç (Bugünkü Günyüzü), Gecek, Koçaş, Babadad, Demirci köylerini gözlemleyen heyet bu köylerin kaç hane olduğunu ve ne kadarının zarar ziyana uğradığını raporunda ayrıntılı biçimde ele almıştır. Söz konusu rapor ve arkasındaki ilişkiler ve bağlantılar bu çalışma kapsamında değerlendirilerek Milli Mücadele yıllarında Anadolu’da yaşanan Yunan tahribatına dair bir panorama çizilmeye çalışılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yunan Mezalimi, Türk Milli Mücadelesi, Amerikan Misyonerler, Sivrihisar.

Introduction

Many cities came into prominence for both its geopolitical significance and its social structure in the process of gaining independence by the Turkish nation. Eskişehir and its vicinity, which had a significant place among those cities, witnessed some breaking points in the process of independence. The city, which changed considerably in the late 19th century and early 20th century, turned into a more developed city when compared to the cities of central Anatolia. Especially, the arrival of the railroads to the city in this period contributed into the development of the city significantly. The location of the city at a junction on the Anatolian-Baghdad Railroad allowed the city to achieve strategic significance.¹ Due to its geopolitical position, the city encountered significant events during the First World War² and the Turkish National Struggle. Due to all these basic reasons, the city played a key role in the independence process of the Turkish Nation.

1 İhsan Güneş-Kemal Yakut, *Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet’e Eskişehir (1840-1923)*, Anadolu Üniversitesi Yay., Eskişehir 2007, pp. 10-11; Ali Sarıkoyuncu, Selahattin Önder, Mesut Erşan, *Milli Mücadelede Eskişehir*, Osmangazi Üniversitesi Yay., Eskişehir 2012, pp. 7-8.

2 Against the possibility of the fleet of the Entente Powers to pass the Dardanelles, the İstanbul Government thought about moving the Sultan and Government to Eskişehir. However, the idea was given up because the Ottomans won the war. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılabı Tarihi*, Vol. 3, B. 2, TTK Basımevi, Ankara 1991, pp. 73-74.

The Ottoman State, which was defeated at the end of the First World War, withdrew from the war with the Armistice of Mudros. The Entente Powers started to occupy the lands, which they determined, as their zone of influence in the consequence of secret meetings and agreements³ among themselves.⁴ In this regard, the Entente Powers shared a large section of Anatolia and completed the first stage of their occupation from November 3, 1918 until the date when the National Struggle started without honoring the conditions of the Armistice.⁵ Within this process, people started to see signs for the prospective occupation of Eskişehir. For securing their route to India and controlling Anatolia, Great Britain wanted to take control of the railroads. In this regard, occupation of Eskişehir, which was located at the junction of the Anatolian-Baghdad Railroad, was significant for the interests of Great Britain.⁶ For this reason, the British sent an advance force to Eskişehir and actually occupied the city on January 22, 1919.⁷ Despite the great reaction of the residents of the city against the occupation, the İstanbul Government did nothing but asked people to remain silent for preventing any incidents in the region and appeasing the occupiers.⁸ Shortly after the occupation, the people started reacting against the excesses that the British committed in the region

3 For detailed information regarding meetings and treaties made for sharing the Ottoman lands, see: Harry N. Howard, *Türkiye'nin Taksimi Bir Diplomasi Tarihi (1913-1923)*, trans. Salih Sabit Togay, TTK Yay., Ankara 2018, pp. 239-246; Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılabı Tarihi*, Vol. 3, B. 4, TTK Basımevi, Ankara 1991, pp. 1-39; *Türk İstiklal Harbi*, Vol. 2, B. 1, T.C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Yay., Ankara 1999, pp. 1-2.

4 The Entente Powers frequently applied the 7th and 15th Articles of the Armistice of Mudros to occupy the Ottoman lands. To get detailed information regarding the Armistice, see: *Türk İstiklal Harbi*, Vol. 1, T.C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Yay., Ankara 1999, pp. 47-49.

5 To get information about the regions occupied by the British, French, Italians and Greeks, see: Şerafettin Turan, *Türk Devrim Tarihi İmparatorluğun Çöküşünden Ulusal Direnişe*, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara 2008, pp. 82-83; Sabahattin Selek, *Anadolu İbtılâli*, Vol. 1, Kastaş Yay., İstanbul 1987, pp. 189-190.

6 Mesut Erşan, *Milli Mücadele'nin Başlangıcında Eskişehir'in Önemi*, Unpublished Master's Thesis, Atatürk University Institute of Atatürk Principles and Revolution History, Erzurum 1991, p. 7; Sarıkoyuncu et. al., *ibid*, p. 8. In the period when the Baghdad Railroad project was put forward, the British opposed this project because they believed that it would endanger the safety of their route to India and harm their interests in the Middle East. See: Murat Özyüksel, "Anadolu ve Bağdat Demiryolları", *Osmanlı*, Vol. 3, Yeni Türkiye Yay., Ankara, 1999, p. 669. Also see: Güneş-Yakut, *ibid*, p. 147.

7 Zeki Saruhan, *Kurtuluş Savaşı Günlüğü I*, TTK Basımevi, Ankara 1993, p. 105.

8 Zafer Koylu, *Esaretten Özgürlüğe 423 Gün*, Eskişehir Ticaret Odası Yay., Eskişehir 2012, p. 22.

and their desecration of spiritual values of the people including their silence regarding the incidents caused by the Greeks and Armenians.⁹ The gradually increasing anger of the people against the occupiers reached to its peak when the Greeks landed on İzmir.

When the Entente Powers found the Greek Army as a solution for their increasing needs for their military during the First World War, they started to get the Greeks to go to war with the Turks. The British, who assumed an important role in this process, offered a certain part of the western Anatolian lands to the Greeks in exchange for their going into war.¹⁰ The Greeks used this as an opportunity to materialize their ideal called “Megali Idea”¹¹ and joined the war.¹² By the termination of the war, the Greeks used every opportunity to materialize this ideal and requested the promised lands and the Entente Powers finally accepted this request at the Paris Peace Conference.¹³ Thusly, the Greek troops occupied İzmir on May 15, 1919.¹⁴ The occupation, which started with İzmir and continued by expanding in a manner that would violate the Armistice of Mudros, caused the awakening of the national consciousness of the Turks. Just like it was the case throughout the country, in Eskişehir people also protested the occupation of İzmir by marches and rallies.¹⁵ The reaction of the city against the occupation was not just limited to protests and rallies, and people started to prepare for armed resistance in the city in a period when the principles of the Anatolian Revolution were being determined in Amasya.¹⁶ Infantry officer and Sub Province Governor Arif Bey,

9 Koylu, *ibid*, p. 31; Güneş-Yakut, *ibid*, p. 148.

10 Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *ibid*, pp. 185-190.

11 To get detailed information regarding the emergence of the ideal of Megali Idea and application of it by the Greek State in the historical process, see: Richard Clogg, *Modern Yunanistan Tarihi*, trans. Dilek Şendil, İletişim Yay., İstanbul 1992, pp. 65-124.

12 Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılabı Tarihi*, Vol. 3, B. 3, TTK Basımevi, Ankara 1991, p. 569; Mustafa Turan, *Yunan Mezalimi (İzmir, Aydın, Manisa, Denizli-1919-1923)*, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yay., Ankara 1999, p. 3.

13 Turan, *Türk Devrim Tarihi...*, pp. 125-126.

14 To get more information regarding the occupation, see: *ibid*, pp. 126-131; Turan, *Yunan Mezalimi...*, pp. 6-8; *Türk İstiklal Harbi 2(1)*, pp. 40-43.

15 To get information about the protests and rallies that took place in Eskişehir against the occupation of İzmir, see: Ali Sarıkoyuncu, “Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde Eskişehir Mitingleri ve Çekilen Protesto Telgrafları”, *Balıkesir Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Vol. 3, No. 4, Balıkesir 2000, pp. 251-257.

16 Selek, Vol. 1, p. 262. Also, for the Amasya Decisions, where the principles of national resis-

who organized various groups against the Greek occupation, Major Abdullah, Engineer Captain Nurettin and one Artillery Lieutenant came to Seyitgazi and started to gather soldiers in the region against the Greeks.¹⁷ The national resistance movement, which created a reaction among the members of the İstanbul Government, caused the Governor of Eskişehir and the British to take harsh measures in the region.¹⁸ Ali Fuat Pasha acted against the measures taken by the İstanbul Government, which was cooperating with the occupiers, to destroy the national consciousness. For establishing the national resistance organizations, Fuat Pasha separated the 20th Army Corps into various zone and location commands. With this organization, the Governorate of Eskişehir constituted the second zone and Chief Clerk of Army Recruiting Office and Governor İbrahim Bey was appointed as the acting commander.¹⁹ With the establishment of the national resistance organizations, the city became the arena for power struggle between the İstanbul Government and the nationalists.

Sivas Congress, which was an important turning point in the history of the National Struggle, led to the unification of local organizations throughout the country struggling for saving the cities and towns where those local organizations operated. Thusly, the Sivas Congress allowed the Turkish nation to act commonly in the National War of Independence. For preventing the gathering of the National Congress²⁰, which would be convened in Sivas and to weaken the impact of the decisions, taken in the congress, the İstanbul Government increased its activities in Eskişehir just like it did elsewhere. As

tance were determined on June 21, see: Kemal Atatrk, *Nutuk*, Atatrk Arařtırma Merkezi Yay., Ankara 2012, pp. 21-22.

17 *Harp Tarihi Vesikaları Dergisi*, Genelkurmay Basımevi, Year 11, No. 39, Document No: 939. The efforts of Arif Bey and his friends in establishing the National Forces would be very useful later in the National Struggle and form the basis of the Karakeçeli Division. The National Forces established in Eskişehir continued to grow later on. Resistance organizations named Albayrak, Yeřilbayrak, Őehit Mahmut Bey and Çolak İbrahim Bey were established. See: Koyuncu et. al., *ibid*, p. 14, 46-48.

18 Gneř-Yakut, *ibid*, p. 159.

19 For the declaration that Ali Fuat Cebesoy published in this matter, see: Ali Fuat Cebesoy, *Milli Mcadele Hatıraları*, Vatan Neřriyatı, İstanbul 1953, pp. 80-83.

20 It was decided to send delegates from Eskişehir to the National Congress, which would be convened in Sivas. Bayraktarzade Hseyin, Siyahizade Halil İbrahim and Hsrev Sami Bey were the delegates. In addition, in the consequence of the decisions taken in the Congress, Hsrev Sami Bey was chosen as the member of the Council of Representatives. See: Gneř-Yakut, *ibid*, pp. 163-164; Erřan, *ibid*, pp. 31-34.

of its location, Eskişehir was significant for both the İstanbul Government and the nationalists. The fact that the city was the region where the occupying forces were present at the highest level due to its proximity to İstanbul and was a junction point on the railroad was important in terms of the connection of the city to the Anatolian movement. At the same time, it was also important in terms of its location on the route going to Ankara, which would later become the center of the Anatolian movement. In addition, in terms of the İstanbul Government, the city would be able to keep the western Anatolian region away from the impact of the National Movement and thusly prevent the spread of the Anatolian movement in cooperation with the British who were holding the train lines under their control.²¹ Due to this sensitive condition of the city, Ali Fuat Pasha started acting without losing any time; and on August 18, he announced Eskişehir as the national zone forming the back line of the western Anatolian front, and appointed Atıf Bey as the commander of the zone. However, the activities of Atıf Bey in the region got the attention of the British and caused his arrest by the British in a short amount of time.²² In this short amount of time, Atıf Bey worked for the city to join the National Movement, positioned troops on the commanding heights around the city and attempted to gain control of the city, to prevent the occupying forces to proceed towards to the east of Eskişehir and to organize resistance groups in the region.²³ Besides, it had been worked for the establishment and organization of the Countrywide Resistance Organization (*Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti*, literally means Organization for Protection of Rights) in great secrecy.²⁴ Upon the arrest of Atıf Bey, Fuat Pasha understood that he would be unable to manage the situation in the region from Ankara and decided to move to the city. Fuat Pasha notified his decision to the National Congress, which was going on at the time in Sivas and went to Eskişehir, and thusly he initiated the First Eskişehir Campaign.²⁵ When he reached Sivrihisar on September 13, he realized that

21 Selahattin Tansel, *Mondrostan Mudanya'ya Kadar*, Vol. 2, Milli Eğitim Basımevi, Ankara 1978, p. 128; Sarıkoçuncu et. al. *ibid*, p. 13; Cebesoy, *ibid*, p. 182, 185-186; Erşan, *ibid*, pp. 8-11; Güneş-Yakut, *ibid*, pp. 162-163.

22 İhsan Güneş, "I. Dünya Savaşı'ndan Cumhuriyete Eskişehir", *Kurtuluş ve Aydınlanma: Eskişehir Arşivi Belgeleriyle*, Anadolu Üniversitesi Yay., Ankara 2009, pp.195-196; Cebesoy, *ibid*, p. 185.

23 Cebesoy, *ibid*, p.195; Güneş, *ibid*, p. 196.

24 Among the people who played important roles in the establishment of the Organization, there were names such as accountant Sabri Bey, Major Hacı Veli Efendi, Mufti Mehmet Efendi. To get more information about this matter, see: Güneş, *ibid*, p. 197.

25 Ali Fuat Pasha came to Eskişehir with a cavalry unit, a mountain unit and one supply and one combat unit. See: Cebesoy, *ibid*, p. 189.

the İstanbul Government appointed Hamdi Pasha²⁶ as the Commander of the 20th Army Corps; Hamdi Pasha and Governor Hamit Bey played an active role in making the city a power center against the National Congress. For decreasing the activities of the İstanbul Government and strengthening the loyalty of Eskişehir towards the decision of the National Congress, Fuat Pasha prepared a plan in a short amount of time and accelerated his activities in the region.²⁷ The local administration, which was upset due to the activities of Fuat Pasha, attempted to take measures against Fuat Pasha's activities.²⁸ The local administrators sought the support of the British; they even planned to set people against each other.²⁹

Although the National Movement increased their troops in the region³⁰, at first the British preferred to remain impartial against them. When the activities of the nationalists in the city increased gradually³¹, the British started to display attitudes against the National Movement, and acted intimidatingly by stating

- 26 The activities of Ali Fuat Pasha to organize the national resistance in this region upset the İstanbul Government and the British. The İstanbul Government dismissed Fuat Pasha to stop his activities, then appointed first Ahmet Hulusi Pasha, and later (Kiraz) Ahmet Hamdi Paşa in his position. See: Sina Akşin, *İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele*, Vol. 1, Cem Yayınevi, İstanbul 1992, p. 500.
- 27 According to the plan that he prepared, Fuat Pasha would hold the entrances and exits of the city and control the communication lines with the national troops, attempt to encourage people to join the national forces and to form military units, and announce that the activities in the region were not against the occupying troops. In this regard, Ali Fuat Pasha met Sally Sasson who was the Occupation Commander for Eskişehir and explained the purpose of the national movement. See: İsmail Yıldırım, *Milli Mücadele'nin Başlangıcında Eskişehir (22 Ocak 1919-20 Mart 1920)*, Eskişehir Büyükşehir Belediyesi Yay., Eskişehir 1998, pp. 46-47, 54-58; Cebesoy, *ibid*, p.196, 212-213; Güneş-Yakut, *ibid*, pp. 166-169.
- 28 The local government, Hamdi Pasha, applied to the War Ministry to prevent the activities of the national movement in Eskişehir, and requested the influential commanders in the region to report to them and requested some money for overcoming the national movement. See: *Harp Tarihi Vesikaları Dergisi*, Genelkurmay Basımevi, Year 12, No. 46, Document No: 1072.
- 29 Cebesoy, *ibid*, p. 203; Güneş-Yakut *ibid*, pp. 170-171.
- 30 On September 21, İsmail Hakkı Bey entered Kütahya with 350 troops and took the city under the control of the National Congress, and the British troops in this region moved to Eskişehir. See: Cebesoy, *ibid*, p. 207; Erşan, *ibid*, p. 56.
- 31 In the late September of 1919 the nationalists started to organize rallies in the city, and the people attempted to rise up against the governor and replace him and thusly get under the control of the National Congress, but this was prevented by the British and the local government, and many people were arrested. See: Sarıkoyuncu et. al. *ibid*, p. 34.

that they would act against the National Movement if it attempted to enter Eskişehir.³² However, despite all measures taken in the city, they were unable to stop the nationalist forces, and sub provinces of Seyitgazi, Mahmudiye, Mihaliççık, Sivrihisar and Çifteler cut their ties with Eskişehir and adhered to the decisions of the Congress.³³ Due to the strengthening of the nationalists in the city, Hamdi Pasha desparately resigned from his position.³⁴ During this time, the İstanbul Government took measures³⁵ such as forming secret organizations in the city, establishing the organization named Town Security and declaring martial law in the region.³⁶ Such measures taken due to desperation did not prevent people from demanding independence and the resignation of the Damat Ferit Government during the protests in the city, which started on October 1, caused the protests to serve their purpose and led Eskişehir to adhere to the National Movement. During this process, Çolakoğlu Sabri Bey, who was the accountant of the city, replaced Hilmi Bey³⁷ as the new governor of the city.³⁸ Ali Fuat Pasha also took measures in the region while completing the first stage of the Eskişehir Campaign.³⁹ Following the nationalists' taking control of the city, the Countrywide Resistance Organization of Anatolia and Rumelia opened a branch in the city.⁴⁰

Upon the resignation of Damat Ferit Government, which could not resist the pressure coming from Anatolia and establishment of Ali Rıza Government, which had a moderate policy against the Anatolian movement, the nationalists established their ties with İstanbul again. In this regard, the Committee of

32 Cebesoy, *ibid*, p. 215, 226.

33 Yıldırım, *ibid*, p. 51.

34 Cebesoy, *ibid*, pp. 203-205; Erşan, *ibid*, p. 52; Sarıkoyuncu et. al., *ibid*, p. 20.

35 *Harp Tarihi Vesikaları Dergisi*, Genelkurmay Basımevi, Year 12, No. 46, Document No: 1075.

36 Cebesoy, *ibid*, p. 218; Güneş-Yakut, *ibid*, p.169, 174; Yıldırım, *ibid*, pp. 61-65.

37 Governor Hilmi Bey, who was against the National Struggle was assassinated on October 4 and died. The person or persons who assassinated him could not be found after the investigation. To get more information about this matter, see: Zafer Koçlu, "Eskişehir Mutasarrıfı Hilmi Bey'in Öldürülmesi", *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, No. 46, Ankara 2010, pp. 425-455.

38 Instead of Sabri Bey who was the Governor, Fatin Bey became the Governor. See: Güneş and Yakut, *ibid*, p. 177, 181.

39 According to the cautious plan of Fuat Pasha, an intelligence organization would be established in the region, and national troops which would be controlled from Eskişehir and Seyitgazi would be established. See: Cebesoy, *ibid*, pp. 238-239.

40 To get information about this matter, see: Yıldırım, *ibid*, p. 76-77; Erşan, *ibid*, pp. 92-93.

Representatives and the İstanbul Government met in Amasya⁴¹, and in the consequence of the meetings, they made decisions regarding elections and opening the Parliament.⁴² Following the inauguration of the last Ottoman Parliament on January 12, 1920, the announcement of the Decisions of the National Oath⁴³ and strengthening of the National Movement in Anatolia made the Entente Powers upset. In response, the Occupying Forces decided to occupy İstanbul to dominate the nationalists and to sign the peace treaty right away.⁴⁴

By the occupation of İstanbul on March 16, the National Movement entered into a sensitive period.⁴⁵ This extraordinary situation made it necessary to take new measures in Anatolia. According to plan the National Forces would take control of the railroads, push away the occupying forces from the region and thusly secure the Western Front.⁴⁶ To realize this plan, Ali Fuat Pasha started the Second Eskişehir Campaign on March 17 and transferred his powers to Mahmut Bey, Acting Commander of the 20th Army Corps. Mahmut Bey took control of Ağapınar Train Station, which was located in east of

41 Eskişehir came to the fore in the meetings among the leaders of the National Movement regarding where the Parliament would convene in this process, however as it was decided to convene in İstanbul, this decision was given up. Besides, for enlightening and determining the strategies of the representatives who supported the nationalist ideas and would go to İstanbul, the Committee of Representatives decided that the representatives go to Eskişehir and meet there. Also in this process, the city was thought as the center of the Committee of Representatives because it was closer to the western Anatolian front, however this idea was given up because the city was under the control of the British. See: Cebesoy, *ibid*, p. 254, 259; Güneş-Yakut, *ibid*, p. 188; Erşan, *ibid*, pp. 96-98.

42 To get detailed information regarding the decisions made in the Amasya Meeting, see: *Nutuk*, pp. 167-170.

43 The document where the principles that the Turkish independence movement needed to follow in achieving political goals was announced to all nations on February 17, 1920. For detailed information, see: Şerafettin Turan, *Türk Devrim Tarihi Ulusal Direnişten Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne*, Vol. 2, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara 2017, pp. 82-90.

44 To get more information regarding the reasons for the occupation of İstanbul by the Entente Powers, see: Selahattin Tansel, *Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya Kadar*, Vol. 3, Milli Eğitim Basımevi, Ankara 1978, pp. 39-45.

45 For the official notification of the Occupying Forces regarding the occupation of İstanbul, see: Atatürk, *Nutuk*, pp. 283-284.

46 Mustafa Kemal notified the precautions that needed to be taken on 16-17 March in a communicate that he sent to the Commands and Offices of Governates. For the details, see: Selek, *Anadolu İhtilâli (1)*, p. 335-336; Güneş-Yakut, *ibid*, p. 189.

Eskişehir, with the 143rd Regiment and the Ankara National Platoon, and located the platoons on the commanding heights. The British could not even perform a military intervention against this military blockade performed fast and orderly. On March 20, the Turkish troops blockaded the British troops completely by the involvement of the Eskişehir Platoon into the situation. Same day, Mahmut Bey asked the British to evacuate the city in one hour and to withdraw to İzmit, otherwise he notified that he would start the military operation. The British Commander in Eskişehir notified that the time for evacuation was not sufficient and requested for 24 hours; however, Mahmut Bey did not accept their request. In response, the British left the city by leaving behind many military equipment.⁴⁷ Thusly, Eskişehir emancipated from the British occupation after 423 days.⁴⁸ The emancipation of the city led to the establishment of the National Government safely.⁴⁹ Thusly, the first stage of the National Movement in the city was completed successfully, and preparations against Greeks, who set out with the dream of “Megali Idea”, started.

Although more than one year passed since the signature of the Armistice, the Entente Powers were unable to determine the conditions of peace, which was mainly caused by the conflict of interest of the Entente Powers over the Turkish lands. Within this time, the Anatolian movement became unstoppable and this worried the Entente Powers. Therefore, the Entente Powers started acting to determine the conditions of peace and get them accepted by the Turks. In this regard, while the Entente Powers were determining the conditions of peace after a series of conferences, they decided to expand the Greek occupation to suppress the National Movement and get the conditions of the treaty accepted by the Turks.⁵⁰ In this context, the Turkish defenses performed by the National Troops lacking equipment were unable to be successful against the Greek move forward⁵¹, which started from three separate points on June 22, and the

47 Cebesoy, *ibid*, pp. 316-317.

48 Yıldırım, *ibid*, p. 80; Koçlu, *ibid*, p. 261.

49 Cebesoy, *ibid*, p. 320.

50 Turan, *Ulusal Direnişten Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne*, p. 185-191; Tansel, *Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya Kadar (3)*, p. 155-157.

51 The Turks obtained intelligence regarding the Greek offensive beforehand. On June 21, Mustafa Kemal made meetings regarding the Turkish defenses and the condition of the Army in Eskişehir with the representatives and high rank officers. In the consequence of the meeting, Ali Fuat Pasha became the commander of the Western Front; and afterwards Fuat Pasha carried the headquarters of the 20th Army Corps to Eskişehir. After coming to the city, Fuat Pasha especially worked for establishing a regular army. See: Cebesoy, *ibid*, p. 425, 437;

Greeks occupied many cities of western Anatolia.⁵² However, the Entente Powers were unable to achieve the desired successes and stop the Anatolian resistance. To get the Treaty of Sevres accepted by the Turks for the purpose of destroying the Turkish nation and eliminating the national resistance, it was important for the Entente Powers to capture Ankara, which was the center of the National Government. For this purpose, the Greeks planned to take control of the railroad lines with a fast attack throughout the Eskişehir-Ankara railroad line and thusly stop the supplies coming to the Turkish troops.⁵³ In the event that this plan succeeded, the Greeks would also have access to Ankara. Therefore, Eskişehir became a sensitive military issue in the Turco-Greek wars, and three battles out of five took place here.⁵⁴ Within this plan, the first bloody battle between the Turkish and Greek armies took place in the İnönü location. The Greek forces, which took the advantage of the Çerkez Ethem rebellion and the unpreparedness of the regular army,⁵⁵ started proceeding towards Bursa and Uşak on January 6 as they planned earlier.⁵⁶ The trifurcate Greek military operation reached to İnönü, which constituted the center of the Turkish defense line, in the consequence of smaller skirmishes. On January 9 and 10⁵⁷, the Turkish defense responded successfully to the attacks of the Greek troops with the joining of the auxiliary forces coming from Ankara. In response, the Greek troops left the areas that they captured and started to withdraw. Although the Turks expected a Greek attack on January 11, the Greeks continued to withdraw in the same day.⁵⁸

Güneş-Yakut, *ibid*, pp. 203-204.

52 *Nutuk*, p. 315; Şerafettin Turan, *Ulusal Direnişten Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne*, p. 228-229.

53 *Türk İstiklal Harbi*, Vol. 2, B. 3, Genelkurmay Basımevi, Ankara 1999, p. 149; Taner Bilgin, *Milli Mücadele Döneminde Bilecik*, PhD Thesis, Sakarya University Institute of Social Sciences, Sakarya 2012, p. 179.

54 Sabahattin Selek, *Anadolu İhtilali*, Vol. 2, Kastaş Yay., İstanbul 1987, p. 491.

55 Turan, *Ulusal Direnişten Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne*, p. 240.

56 On the first day when the Greek forward operation started, the activities of Çerkez Ethem and his troops composed of 50 or 150 men in Eskişehir got the attention of the Turkish forces, and it became necessary to follow the activities of Çerkez Ethem and his men. See: *Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi*, Genelkurmay Basımevi, Year 40, No. 91, 1991, Document No: 2271; Selek, *Anadolu İhtilali (2)*, p. 493.

57 Upon the increasing of the Greek attacks on January 10, the Chief of Staff ordered the troops to destroy the railroads if it became impossible to defend Eskişehir. See: *Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi*, Genelkurmay Basımevi, Year 40, No. 91, Document No: 2290.

58 Selek, *Anadolu İhtilali (2)*, pp. 492-496.

At a moment when the regular army was not fully prepared and the Çerkez Ethem rebellion was going on, this victory against the Greeks indicated to the Entente Powers that they had underestimated the Turkish National Movement. However, the Entente Powers did not give up their interests in Anatolia and attempted to get the so-called peace accepted by the Turks. In this context, although the Entente Powers gave certain concessions to the Turkish side in the London Conference by not altering the essence of the agreement, the Ankara Government clearly indicated that it would not compromise the principle of full independence and terminated the negotiations.⁵⁹ The Entente Powers, which attempted everything to secure their interests in Anatolia, ordered the Greek troops to attack Turks in a period while the negotiations with the Turks were going on.⁶⁰ The Office of the Greek Chief of Staff was planning to capture the Eskişehir-Afyonkarahisar railroad in six days and to destroy the Turkish Army in three months in this manner.⁶¹ However, the Turks became aware of the Greek military campaign during the London Conference⁶² and the Turks started to prepare for the battle. Commander of the Western Front, İsmet Pasha planned to meet the Greek forces in İnönü as this was the case in the First İnönü Battle and determined the defense line accordingly. The Turkish forces was divided in three groups, namely the west (Eskişehir), south (Afyon) and Kocaeli; and the Greek Army formed two groups, namely Bursa and Uşak.⁶³ The Greek troops started their forward move towards Eskişehir and Afyon on March 23 in two separate groups. On March 24, the Uşak group of the Greek Army reached up to Dumlupınar trenches and occupied the region. The Greek troops, which attacked again on March 25, occupied Afyon. The Office of the Turkish Chief of Staff prioritized İnönü because it did not want to lose Eskişehir to the Greeks from a strategic perspective and planned to save Afyon from occupation again by defeating the Greeks. With the arrival of the Bursa group of the Greek Army to İnönü on March 26, the main battle started in the morning on March 27. In the consequence of close combat, which lasted for three days, the lines of both sides were intertwined.

59 Selahattin Tansel, *Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya Kadar*, Vol. 4, Başbakanlık Basımevi, Ankara 1947, pp. 35-48.

60 *Nutuk*, p. 393; Turan, *Ulusal Direnişten Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne*, pp. 247-248.

61 Ahmet Özgiray, "İnönü Savaşları ve Arnold Toynbee", *Tarihte Eskişehir Sempozyumu-I (2-4 November 1998)*, Anadolu Üniversitesi Yay., Eskişehir 2001, p. 275.

62 *Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi*, Genelkurmay Basımevi, Year 40, No. 92, Document No: 2311.

63 To get information regarding the preparations for the war, defense plan and condition of the military forces, see: Selek, *Anadolu İhtilâli (2)*, pp. 588-590.

Although the Greeks captured Metristepe in the consequence of the battle that took place on March 28, İsmet Pasha decisively ordered the defense line to stay in their trenches. At the most critical moment of the battle, the Guardian Battalion of the Turkish Grand National Assembly entered into the command of the Western Front Commander and joined the war. On March 31, the Greek Army had to withdraw due to the Turkish Army's attack on the right wing of the enemy forces. On April 6, the Greek Army evacuated Afyon and started to withdraw. Violent battles took place between the Turkish and Greek troops from April 8 until April 11 in Aslıhanlar and Dumlupınar; however, it was not possible to push the Greeks out of Dumlupınar.⁶⁴

The Greeks did not give up their ideal of "Megali Idea" despite the bitter experiences that they had in the İnön Battles and wanted to continue the war despite the fact that the High Commissars of the Entente Powers announced their impartiality.⁶⁵ For this purpose, they used up all of their material and nonmaterial sources and announced general mobilization in three months and started to reinforce their army.⁶⁶ During this period the Greek staff officers quit the attack strategy that caused their defeat in the İnön Battles and prepared a new and effective plan for their military operation. According to the plan, while the Bursa group was making a diversion battle with the Turkish Army in İnön, the Uşak group would go behind Eskişehir after occupying Afyon and Ktahya and cut off the Ankara road. Thusly, the Greeks thought that they would destroy the Turkish Army entirely.⁶⁷ At its preparatory stage, the Greek Army was more equipped than the Turkish Army; and in terms of their military strength, two Turkish divisions were equal to one Greek division.⁶⁸ In this content, the southern section of the Western Front in the Turkish Army was eliminated; the whole front was united under a single commander; and İsmet Pasha assumed the commandership position. In this process, the high rank staff officers determined the Turkish defense plan and attempted to hold the Greek troops in four groups on the İnön-Ktahya-Dger line. Following the completion of the military preparations, the Greek attack started on July

64 *Nutuk*, p. 394; Selek, *Anadolu İhtilali (2)*, pp. 590-592; Turan, *Ulusal Direnişten Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne*, pp. 247-248.

65 Tansel, *Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya Kadar (4)*, p. 97.

66 Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Tek Adam*, Vol. 2, Remzi Kitapevi, İstanbul 1999, p. 441.

67 Selek, *Anadolu İhtilali (2)*, p. 631.

68 Selek, *Anadolu İhtilali (2)*, p. 635. To get more comparative information about the amount of power and ammunition of both Armies, see: Güneş-Yakut, *ibid*, p. 218.

8 with the operation of the Bursa group. Two divisions moving from the Bursa group came to northwest of Kütahya on July 13 and held that line. Greeks, who started their operation again from the Bursa group on July 10, moved towards İnönü with two divisions. In the same day, while the Greeks were moving towards the Göynük-Viran line with a division from the Uşak group, three Greek divisions started attacking from further south and moved towards Afyon. In the consequence of bloody battles made between 13 and 16 July, the risk for encircling the Turkish defense line arose. The Greek troops continued attacking the Turkish defense line towards the left wing from the Kütahya region on July 16. İsmet Pasha gave the order to withdraw because the Greek operation gradually became more dangerous. In the meantime, Mustafa Kemal came to the Headquarters of the Western Front located in Eskişehir as the situation in the battle became sensitive. In the consequence of the meetings that Mustafa Kemal made with his staff officers, he decided to withdraw the Turkish Army to the east of Sakarya River. Following this decision, Eskişehir was completely evacuated on July 19. Although the Turkish troops were partially successful in their counter attack to recapture Eskişehir on July 21, they were unable to capture the city. After this date, the Turks understood the necessity of the withdrawal and by the order of İsmet Paşa that he gave on July 23, the Turkish troops withdraw to the eastern side of Sakarya River until July 25. İsmet Pasha moved the headquarters of the front to Polatlı upon the order of withdrawal.⁶⁹

The capture of Eskişehir, which was important strategically in the Kütahya-Eskişehir Battles, by the Greeks caused a great sorrow in Ankara. With the fall of Eskişehir, the Greeks started to believe that the Turks did not have the power to withstand any more and the victory was a matter of time. However, as the Greek commander Anastasios Papoulas stated, Turks did not make a request for peace despite the fact that they withdrew from Eskişehir⁷⁰ and carried their struggle of independence to Sakarya. For about 10 or 15 days from the Battles of Kütahya-Eskişehir until the date when the Sakarya War started, the Greeks carried their headquarters to Eskişehir; and deployed its First Army Corps and Cavalry Units in Eskişehir, Second Army Corps in Seyitgazi region and Third Army Corps in Alpu region.⁷¹ Additionally, in this period, the Greeks also

69 Selek, *Anadolu İhtilali (2)*, pp. 637-640; Aydemir, *ibid*, pp. 442-446; Tansel, *Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya Kadar (4)*, pp. 99-104. Also, to get detailed information about the incidents that took place in Eskişehir, see: Koyuncu et. al. *ibid*, pp. 86-101.

70 Güneş, *ibid*, p. 216; Tansel, *Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya Kadar (4)*, p. 104.

71 Güneş, *ibid*, p. 216.

took measures to overcome the deficiencies and prevent the possible problems regarding supplies during the Greek forward operation.⁷² Within the same period, the Ankara Government made important decisions regarding the administration and supply of the Turkish Army. In this context, the Turkish Grand National Assembly gave Mustafa Kemal Pasha the responsibility and powers of “Commander in Chief” which gathered all powers of the National Assembly for three months. Additionally, the National Assembly put the National Taxation Decisions (*Tekâlif-i Milliye Kararları*) in effect for meeting the needs of the Army.⁷³ Following the completion of the preparations, the Greek King Konstantin ordered his army to move forward towards Ankara to achieve the final victory. On August 13, the Greek troops started their forward operation from Eskişehir and a day later occupied Sivrihisar. The Greek troops, which were moving forward and did not face any obstacle until August 17, met the Turkish troops on the west side of Sakarya River. The Turkish troops located in the region withdrew by skirmishing to slow down the Greek forward operation. Until August 23, no serious battle took place between the two armies, and the Greek Army, which started its attack with all of its might, captured strategically important points. On August 27, 28 and 29 the Turkish defense line started to shatter in certain locations, and in response, all troops withdrew to a back line. The Greeks used this opportunity and continued to move further on September 2, and captured Mt. Çal. In the meantime, at first, the Ankara Government thought about a withdrawal, however when the Turkish troops repelled the Greek attack on September 4, the Ankara Government gave up this idea. In the consequence of the successful defense of the Turkish Army, the Greek Army lost its ability to attack and switched to defense. The Turkish troops, which started a general attack on September 10, forced the Greek Army to withdraw. After this successful attack, no Greek troops remained in the east of Sakarya River since September 13.⁷⁴

The conclusion of the Sakarya War with the Turkish victory showed the occupying forces that they would not be able to destroy the Turkish independence movement and to get their interests in Anatolia. The Ankara Government wanted the occupying forces to withdraw from Anatolia with this victory through peace negotiations. However, the Entente Powers, which did not give

72 Tansel, *Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya Kadar* (4), p. 111.

73 Turan, *Ulusal Direnişten Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne*, p. 250; Aydemir, *ibid*, pp. 445-447.

74 Turan, *Ulusal Direnişten Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne*, p. 251; Tansel, *Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya Kadar* (4), pp. 111-115; Selek, *Anadolu İhtilâli* (2), pp. 647-667.

up their imperialist thoughts, were stalling the Turks with the so-called peace negotiations and making offers similar to those of the Treaty of Sevres. The failure of the peace negotiations left no option for the Turks other than using military force.⁷⁵ The Ankara Government worked to reinforce the Army and prepared a war plan secretly to drive the Greeks from Anatolia. During this period, in the plan prepared against the Greek forces, which withdrew behind the Eskişehir-Afyon line, the Ankara Government attempted to gather the enemy forces in one of the wings of the front, get behind the Greek forces and destroy them. Following the completion of all preparations secretly, the Great Offensive (Battle of Dumlupınar) started with the fire of the Turkish artillery in the morning of August 26, 1922. The Turkish troops captured important locations in the consequence of the skirmishes which continued in the same day; and on August 27, openings started to appear in the Greek defense line. In the meantime, realizing that the Turkish cavalry was getting behind them, the Greek troops gathered in the Afyon-Sincanlı plains, the troops of the First Army managed to enter Afyon. On August 28, the Turkish Army moved against the Greek troops in Eskişehir region and prevented them from withdrawing towards İzmir. As a consequence of the operation conducted against the Greek Army encircled in Dumlupınar on August 30, the Turkish Army destroyed the enemy troops. On September 1, Mustafa Kemal gave the order of moving forward to the Turkish Army, which chased the Greek troops, and tried to destroy it.⁷⁶ In the consequence of the chasing, which started with the order of Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish Army saved the whole Anatolia from the Greek occupation. Eskişehir, which lived under the Greek oppression for 1 year, 1 month and 14 days, was freed from the occupation on September 2.⁷⁷ In the period when the Turkish War of Independence was going on, the Greek troops performed various atrocities such as burning houses, looting and raping women during both their moving forward and withdrawal and applied all kinds of torture and punishment to the people living under their occupation. It is possible to see the evidence of the atrocities in many Ottoman records. However, we do not encounter many examples of the destruction caused by the Greeks in the Western sources and documents of foreign observers. Witnessing one of the rare samples of the records of those atrocities in the writings of

75 To get information regarding this matter, see: Turan, *Ulusal Direnişten Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne*, pp. 261-266; Tansel, *Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya Kadar (4)*, pp. 123-132.

76 Turan, *Ulusal Direnişten Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne*, pp. 267-270.

77 Zafer Koylu-Melis Birgün, *Eski Bir Şebirin Hikayesi 1923-1938*, Eskişehir Ticaret Odası Yay., Eskişehir 2015, p. 30; Sarıkoyuncu et. al. *ibid*, p. 151.

two American missionaries without hiding anything constitutes a very valuable source.

American Missionaries and Their Observations Regarding Greek Atrocities

Following the signature of Armistice of Mudros, ending the war between the Ottoman State and the belligerent countries, Anatolian people witnessed the arrival of a new missionary committee from the United States to the Ottoman lands. Namely, the organization named American Near East Relief Committee (its name was “ark-1 Karib Muavenet Cemiyeti” in Ottoman sources) came to Anatolia after the signature of the Armistice of Mudros. Dr. James L. Barton moved to İstanbul in the last day of December of 1918 to represent the organization. Minister of Economy Cavid Bey asked Barton to hurry up regarding American assistance. The organization set up a soup kitchen in İstanbul approximately one month after this meeting that took place on January 15, 1919.⁷⁸ The American Near East Relief Committee, which was one of the few number of foreign organizations allowed to operate in Anatolia by the Ankara Government, was working with the Turkish Red Crescent in providing aid to the people who were victims of the war.⁷⁹ The organization, which had its headquarters in İstanbul, had representatives in many locations of Anatolia. The Ottoman State determined many harmful activities of foreign schools and aid organizations, whose number increased significantly in the last years of the Ottoman rule. In fact, despite the approval given by it, the Ankara Government closely followed up the activities of the American Near East Relief Committee, investigated the news regarding that the organization was serving hostile governments and rejected many of their requests. Although from time to time negative news and reports reached to Ankara regarding the activities of the American Near East Relief Committee, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the leader of the National War of Independence, tolerated the relations of Americans with the Turkish nationalist intellectuals. Regarding this matter, Mustafa Kemal stated the following in an interview that he made with the correspondent of the Turkish daily *Vatan*:

78 Metin Ayıığı, *Kurtuluş Savaşı Sırasında Türkiye’ye Gelen Amerikan Heyetleri*, TTK Yay., Ankara 2004, p. 108.

79 *Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi*, (BCA), 30.0.18.1/5.19.4, 28 September 1338 (1922); For the activities of the Organization with the Turkish Red Crescent during the years of War of National Independence, see: Mehmet Canlı, “Milli Mücadele Döneminde Amerikan ark-1 Karib Muavenet Cemiyetinin Anadolu’daki Bazı Faaliyetleri”, *Askeri Tarih Bülteni*, No. 38, Ankara 1995, pp. 42-49.

The perspective of the Turkish Grand National Assembly regarding the United States is positive. Our Government did not refrain from returning and establishing friendly relations that the Ottoman Government terminated during the [First] World War. Although we did not see any material response coming from the United States for our attempts to establish friendly relations, the American institutions, committees and many Americans in our country are protected and respected just like it happens in a friendly country. Right now, Americans reside everywhere in our country, and they are able to travel wherever they want.⁸⁰

During the days when the National Struggle was continuing, the person who established the connection between the Ankara Government and Americans was Halide Edip [Adivar] who received her education in Robert College and knew English very well contrary to many intellectuals at the time. Her relationship with the United States was related to her admiration towards the democracy of the United States. In fact, this situation may be clearly seen in one of her books. She wrote down the following while she was making remarks about the American society and democracy: “*The living standards of the lowest class in the United States exceeds the living standards of the European middle classes; namely, misery only displays itself during big crises...*”⁸¹ At this point, Halide Edip Adivar was a very important person. Her connection with the Americans was based on her years of education. Her admiration for the personal characteristics of her teachers in the college played a determining role in her friendships that she established with the Americans working at the humanitarian aid organizations (in other words, the Americans who were related to missionary activities) in the following periods of her life.⁸² Halide Edip’s relationship with the Americans going back to her college years became useful in obtaining Americans’ support in her attempts to announce the atrocities that the Greeks performed in Anatolia during the years of National Struggle to the public opinion of the world. Two American workers of the American Near East Relief Committee operating in Anatolia named Annie Allen and Florence Billings served as representatives of the organization before the Ankara Government. Announcing the brutal destruction caused by the Greek troops on their

80 *Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, Vol. III, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yay., Ankara 1997, p. 56.

81 Halide Edip Adivar, *Türkiye’de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, eds. Mehmet Kalpaklı-Nuri Aksu, Can Yay., İstanbul 2009, p. 281.

82 Frances Kazan, *Halide Edip ve Amerika*, trans. Bernar Kutluğ, Bağlam Yay., İstanbul 1995, p. 21, 28.

path while withdrawing due to the repelling the Greek forward operation after the Sakarya Pitched Battle was about the attempts to announce rightful voices of the Turkish National War of Independence to the Western public opinion from the beginning.⁸³ In fact, the Ankara Government wanted to show the marks of the Greek destruction in Anatolia not only to the Western public opinion, but also to all political authorities that had relations with the Ankara Government. Namely, the Afghan Ambassador Ahmed Han would travel up to İzmir through Eskişehir and Afyon after the Sakarya victory to observe the destruction caused by the Greek Army. The situation was notified to Fevzi Pasha in İzmir and he was informed that Ahmed Han would also visit Adana after his travel to İzmir.⁸⁴ Among the persons who prepared the report regarding the Greek atrocities, Florence Billings, who was born in Massachusetts in 1879, started to work at the American Girls College in Bursa in October 1919 after serving in various positions until October. After coming to Bursa, Billings established a strong friendship with Annie Allen, who was the Bursa representative of the American Near East Relief Committee and Billings's supervisor. On the other hand, Annie Allen was the daughter of Rev. O. P. Allen, who was among the pioneering missionaries. She was born in Harput, Türkiye on December 21, 1868 and after graduating from Mount Holyoke College in Massachusetts in 1890, she started her missionary activities in Bursa in 1903.⁸⁵ Halide Edip mentioned the American missionaries Annie Allen and Florence Billings frequently in her memoirs. Halide Edip ran across Allen and Billings in Eskişehir when she went there with her husband Adnan Adıvar to send her sister Nilüfer and her family to Antalya when Nilüfer and her family had to seek refuge in Eskişehir when she had to leave Bursa where she resided because of the forward operation of the Greek Army in the late June 1920.⁸⁶ We understand that Annie Allen was in Ankara right after Ankara became the center of the National Struggle. In fact, according to a news piece published in New York Times on November 11, 1920, Annie Allen and Dr. William S. Dodd were in Ankara to get permission from "the nationalist leaders" for the

83 In this context, for an evaluation of the attempts made for announcing the rightfulness of the War of National Independence in the British public opinion and before The Times, the most prestigious British newspaper, See: Ebru Boyar, "Savaş ve Basın", *ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi*, Vol. 36, No. 2, December 2009, pp. 291-324.

84 BCA, 30.10.0/131.936.7, 20.11. 1338 (1922).

85 www.asteria.fivecolleges.edu/findails/sophiasmith/mnsss362.html

86 Halide Edip Adıvar, *Türkün Ateşle İmtibani*, Vol. 2, Cumhuriyet Yay., İstanbul 1998, pp. 56-57.

prospective activities of the organization.⁸⁷ It is not possible to predict whether Annie Allen left Ankara or not after that date, an official document indicates that the Ankara Government officially received her on June 6, 1337 (1921). In the decree dated June 6, 1921, the Cabinet Council decided "...to accept Miss Allen who came with the letter of the director of American Near East Relief Committee whose headquarters is in İstanbul to represent the organization in Ankara."⁸⁸ It is highly possible that Florence Billings was with Annie Allen who came to Ankara. Because they indicated that they came to Ankara in June in the introductory section of the report where they narrated the Greek atrocities named "Atrocities in Anatolia" which Allen and Billings prepared together. We understand that Annie Allen and Florence Billings witnessed the rebellion, which started in Konya against the National Struggle in the period when Annie Allen was the Ankara representative of the organization.⁸⁹ They also indicated in the report that they accepted the offer to go to Konya by thinking that visiting Konya would not hinder their assistance for the orphans which they were performing along with the Turkish Red Crescent. Although the Ankara Government, which wanted to announce the Greek atrocities in Turkish villages, notified those atrocities to the public opinion of the world by the reports that it prepared, we understand that the Ankara Government thought that it would be much more effective for the persons from impartial countries to report and announce the fact that the Greek Army was withdrawing by destroying the Turkish villages after their defeat. The impressive report regarding the Greek atrocities in seven villages of Sivrihisar prepared by those two American women, who were Halide Edip's close friends, was one of the methods that the Ankara Government wanted to use for announcing its just claim to the rest of the world. If we evaluate this report closely, we may clearly understand how the Greek destruction affected two missionary observers. The text will be provided without omitting any section as follows:

Massacres in Anatolia

Both of us are assigned for humanitarian aid in Anatolia. We came to Ankara in June and currently we are continuing our work without any delay. In July and August, thousands of refugees moved towards

87 "Near East Workers Remain at Posts", *The New York Times*, 11 November 1920.

88 BCA, 30.18.1.1/3.24.7, 6 June 1337 (1921).

89 The matter is also mentioned in the resume of Florence Billings on the website of the archive where her documents are located in the Sophia Smith College, see: www.asteria.fivecolleges.edu/findails/sophiasmith/mnsss362.html

here after the Great Offensive and we helped many people along with the Turkish Red Crescent within the bounds of possibility. Following the withdrawal of the Greek Army from Sakarya after September, the Turkish Government wanted persons from the impartial countries to see the destroyed regions and the Government requested this from us because we were the closest to those areas.

On our account, as we urgently needed to meet certain people in Sivrihisar regarding our works about the orphans, we accepted this offer and thought that we would not be ignoring any one of our responsibilities. We were free to meet and talk with anyone we wished in every village. One of us recorded what was said because she knew Turkish very well (she is Annie Allen and she was born in Türkiye). Annie Allen randomly chose anyone on the street and went to the house of that person with the second interviewer and before leaving the village, she tried to talk to the village headman or the principal of the school. Many people would approve the hospitality and simplicity of the Turkish villagers, and this affected us greatly. They provided their statements in a simple and literal manner.

We remember the simplicity of the speech of a woman in the Oğlakçı village regarding her household goods: “There were many of them speaking our language. I told one of them “My son, my son, why are you doing this to me?” Then they left me alone. However, others came and took away everything”

“Then, were some of them merciful?” (Researcher)

“Yes, why would I lie? Some of them were merciful.”

While one of us was talking to the villagers, the other walked around the ruins and took photographs. There was no need for a translator for what the eye has witnessed, especially for someone who was familiar with the destroyed places in France. The roofs and houses were completely burned, and the stone walls were completely or partially destroyed. The black lines in the fields indicated that the wheat in the fields was burned. The pierced, destroyed and burned copper pots and plates indicated that bayonets and bullets pierced them. The villagers showed us the slightly burnt wheat that they saved by the handful. As the mills were systematically burned down, the villagers ate the wheat in winter by soaking them in water. Generally, the villagers were mentioning that

they were able to save very little food that would last them from ten days to three weeks and they did not have anything to eat afterwards.

Testimonies of the Villagers

We first stopped at the village named

Mülk: composed of 100 houses; 95 of them were burned down.

The village headman told us that this was an organized job, when we begged them not to burn our houses (they were soldiers), they told us that they took orders to do that.

When we talked, a woman said, "They did nothing to the elderly however they captured young women and raped them."

One elderly woman said, "They wanted money from my brother and the Greeks killed him when he said he did not have any money."

The Greek soldiers took away several thousand sheep, oxen and cows from Mülk village; they left nothing for the villagers. Now the only food that they have is burnt wheat.

The mosque in this village was destroyed completely by bombs.

It appears that the fire was ignited by something similar to water (most likely liquid fuel).

Oğlakçı: composed of 50 houses; 46 of them were burned down.

When you pass a small valley after Mülk village, the next village is Oğlakçı village. As the walls in this village were made from mud, briquette and stone and those materials do not burn naturally, they were destroyed terribly. Mehmet son of Asım told me that when the village was set on fire, he attempted to save his house, but the Greek soldiers pushed him into the fire. However, he saved himself. He said, "We went to the Greek Commander who camped in the lower part of the village with petitions, however the soldiers did not allow us to submit our petitions, they tore our petitions." [Mehmet son of Asım]

A woman whom I saw told me that the soldiers came one by one and wanted money from the villagers and when they were unable to get what they wanted, the soldiers beat up people and grabbed coins from the heads of people. A young woman was wearing a headscarf decorated with gold and metal coins [The footnote of the text indicated that one Turkish gold coin was five dollars].

A young woman said, “While I was running away, I threw my gold coins valued twenty-five liras somewhere in the house. When I returned, my gold coins and everything I had was gone, just like my husband whom the Greeks took as a guide and we never heard any news afterwards. I was not raped; however, some women I knew were raped. The Greek soldiers took the men away and later took the women away; those people were not saved yet.”

Mehmet stated his story as follows: “At dusk, many Greek soldiers came suddenly and started to enter into houses; they took everything and loaded them in their automobiles. The cavalry went towards the mountains and started to collect the sheep and capture the women. There were no officers with them and they did not allow the villagers to go to their commander. Eight men were taken and held under arrest for two nights, later three of them were chosen as guides, Mehmet was one of them. The soldiers surrounded him during the trip. He was saved 16 hours later and came back but we never heard of anything about the others. One woman said “the Greek soldiers spared the women after collecting the men and the soldiers raped some of the women.” – one should remember that many men were recruited as soldiers and very few men were left in the villages -”

While we were about to leave the village, one of the villagers said, “one Greek cavalry told me that the Greeks did not go to Ankara because the İstanbul Government did not want them to do that”, later this villager also added: “People say that there was a man or place called Europe, isn't it? The Greek soldier said yes that is Europe, and Europe said burn down and destroy Turkish villages. Therefore, we are not going to leave anything for the Turks here.” “One place or a man called Europe!”

Hamamkarabisar (Black Rock Bath): 60 houses; 57 of them were burned down.

This village is located in a small little valley and known for its natural hot waters; the baths were destroyed. A mosque whose origins go back to the Seljukis was not destroyed but it was used as a stable for animals. The stories regarding looting and beatings are the same here. First, a few houses were set on fire and when the villagers objected to the Commander, the Commander told the villagers to extinguish the fire by themselves. The villagers responded, “How are we going to do that

while the soldiers stay behind us with their bayonets?" Different groups of soldiers came to the village by burning down houses; the people completely left the village at the end. Very few of them returned later. One person having twenty persons associated with him built a roof on a small house, and they each had a saved blanket and very little flour.

Kozağaç (Today's Günyüzü): 200 houses; 196 of them were burned down.

This is a large and wealthy village, the wealth of the village lies in the vineyards. As the vineyards were located on the foothills, they were partially destroyed. Many of the houses have three stories. At the entrance of the village there is a nice square with trees and a water fountain. The walls of the village were terribly damaged. What is left of the mosque is just its minaret. While the villagers were escaping the village, the Greek soldiers captured some women and raped them. Young men were killed by the Greeks while trying to protect women. While we were sitting right next to the water fountain, the women circled us and told us their stories about their losses, their escape to the mountain and stay there for eleven days and living on grapes. A young man at the age of seventeen was forced to burn down his own home.

We saw burned crops across the road and we asked them how they were able to save some wheat. They responded, "We entered into some of the burning houses in a hurry and pulled out some wheat outside." Some people took and washed the charred wheat, and they were eating it.

While we were walking on the street, we were invited to the house of a man who had a lot of wool; this man was able to save hundred okkas⁹⁰ of wool (about 259 pounds⁹¹). A poor woman came next to us and begged us to see her burned house and cows. Some of them asked forgiveness for not being able to offer us something to eat and drink. "In the past, we used to accommodate our guests like sultans, but now we are ashamed that we have nothing to offer them."

The shepherd dogs were wandering around aimlessly because there were no sheep around to protect and a man looking at the green valley

90 One okka is 1 kilo and 283 grams. 100 okkas that the Americans mention is 128.300 kilos.

91 One pound corresponds to 453 grams. 259 pounds is 117.327 kilos, namely it is approximately 100 okkas.

said, "We have grass, but we neither have sheep nor cows to eat it."

One man said, "A very important Pasha (General) stayed as a guest in my house. He promised not to harm the houses; however, they did it. I reminded him his word; he smiled and said that while giving orders the promises were forgotten."

Gecek: 140 houses, 25 houses were burned down; 55 barns were burned down.

This village is out of the main walking direction and that is why it suffered less. We passed our third night in this village. We stayed at a very clean house; our host walked us around the village in the morning. She said to us "The Greeks were about to kill my husband, but I brought all the gold that I owned and gave them to the Greeks. I was able to take my beautiful daughter in law to a distant place so they were unable to capture her. We stayed at the mountains for seven or eight days, later the Turkish cavalry came and saved us." While we were walking around women were getting out of the ruins and begging us to see their houses. A woman insisted us to see her destroyed house. "Look" she said, "I had a very nice house with twelve rooms." While walking difficultly among the ruins of the house with twelve rooms, she said painfully with tears "Am I going to own a house like this again?" Another woman said "We did whatever the Greeks wanted us to do, but did we do any good? Look at our houses!"

The Greeks shot two men while they were trying to save a woman, the woman took the opportunity and ran, but the Greeks also shot her. Her body was found in the creek the next day.

Although the teacher of the village was not in the village during the raid, we asked him to return to record the testimonies of the villagers, and he told us that the Greeks organized their plan very well. Some soldiers destroyed special lines and this was the proof of the organization. An elderly and knowledgeable imam said that he was intimidated three times with knife and every time he saved himself by offering money. "All of my books and my Holy Qur'an which I purchased for hundred liras (One lira is 2 dollars) were torn and burned in front of my eyes. Finally, I managed to escape. However, when I came back, I found that half of my house was burned. The carpets and furniture in the mosque were stolen and the Qur'an in the mosque was burned."

The richest man in the village said, "Yes, we gave everything that we owned to the Greeks while their army was withdrawing and even if they robbed our houses while withdrawing, we said "That is war" however, burning our houses and raping our woman are barbarity." A woman also repeated similar words, "While the Greek Army was moving towards here, we did everything that they asked us to do; we gave them our butter, eggs, chicken; we made bread for them. Did we do any good? These (destroyed houses) are our reward." Even if the pure hearted villagers find it right for the proceeding Greek Army to loot the country, an unethical destruction is not the right of an army moving forward and it may not be perceived as a necessary part of the war.

While we were about to leave the village, a group of women encircled us and talked about what had happened. One of them said, "My sister in law was shot while she was trying to escape from the soldiers. My daughter in law was captured and raped. I begged the soldiers not to burn my house but they said "Isn't your husband a soldier of Kemal [Mustafa Kemal Atatürk]? Ask Kemal what you want!" in response."

Koçaş: 100 houses; 80 houses were burned down.

We reached this village after travelling a few hours by car. We just saw a few oxen grazing and only one oxcart. We met an ex-soldier who served as a guard in the British prison camp and wandering on the streets aimlessly. He said, "I know a few English words" and repeated some of those words. "I was a soldier for a long time" he continued, "but I have never seen such a thing like the ones that the Greek soldiers had done here to us. My brother in law was killed while trying to protect some women. The Greek soldiers captured me while I was trying to escape, tied me and pushed me over a burning haystack, but finally I managed to untie myself and escaped. We stayed at the mountains for ten days. Our mosque was very strong and old. We did not see it burning, but the Greeks demolished it completely, we think that they did it with bombs."

Some people said that while they were trying to extinguish fires, the Greeks said, "If you extinguish the fires, we got orders to punish you." The people escaped to the mountains nearby, the village burned down and an automobile came here with high rank officers, and the villagers wailed and asked help but it did not work. After the Greek soldiers left, the villagers found three men whose throats were cut. They did not

know why those men were killed, and a woman told the men that those three men were killed because they were trying to protect a woman. The Greeks did not take the animals; they killed them. The village had abundant grains, and the Greeks burned them. The Greeks burned all of the mills next to a small village. During their forward operation, the Greek troops did not enter this village, however various groups entered into the village while the Greeks were withdrawing. Every day they took about 200 kilos of food from the village. They started burning the village the first day and they gradually burned the whole village. At first, they threw flyers from the airplanes regarding that the people would not receive any harsh treatment.

Babadad (Babadat): 100 houses, all destroyed, the mill outside of the village was destroyed.

Only two or three families remained here, all others escaped towards Sivrihisar. It appears that the Greek Army stayed for a long time in this village during both the forward operation and the withdrawal. The Greek soldiers raped fifteen women here and killed four men. They took away everything from the village.

Demirci: 45 houses; 25 houses remained intact.

During the forward operation of the Greek Army, the Greek hospital was here and the villagers stated that the Greeks paid for everything that they got, however while they were withdrawing, they stole every penny.

Some of those who were able to escape to the mountains got a bed and blanket with them. Among those who escaped, six women were captured and raped.

The old woman who said “Yes, some of them were merciful” was from this village.

The certain points in all of those stories are revealed one by one. The villagers repeatedly said that the Greek Army performed the destruction systematically.

“They did not allow us to see the Greek officers here (or elsewhere) and they ordered us to extinguish the fires by ourselves.”

“Among many of them knew our language.”

“When they first came, we did everything for them and they told us that they would not harm us, however while they were withdrawing, they stole and burned. They were saying that they got orders.”

“It is a necessity of the war if they take what they need, but they did not have to burn or kill what they did not need.”

We read the official reports of the Turkish authorities regarding those same villages since our visits to those villages started. The information in those reports were overlapping with the information that we gathered. The Turkish authorities reported more than one hundred thirty, which were destroyed in the same manner. The condition of one hundred thirty-two villages that we visited personally was the same. The Greek soldiers burned down houses, injured or killed many women who refused to give any money, raped women, intentionally burned wheat both in houses and threshing floors, stole and took away sheep and cattle, in short, they destroyed everything that empowered the villagers.

The winter is coming. First, the Army needs supplies; in fact, the Army gave a lot of food to the villagers from its own food. Unless a huge effort is displayed, those people have no hopes for the next year’s harvest even if they survive the winter.

We don’t know that whether the world is going to accept such a war legal as it was the case in Europe during the Great War. Will the World act in a manner that would have the Muslim world said “They don’t help us because we are Turkish” by feeling mercy against the suffering women and children?

Annie I. Allen

Florence I. Billings

Members of the American Near East Relief Committee of Anatolia⁹²

Conclusion

The Greek occupation caused a deep destruction in Anatolia. It is understood that the leaders of the Turkish National Struggle, who did everything that they could to document and announce the destruction caused by the Greeks in Anatolia, reached Allie Allen and Florence Billings through Halide Edip to prepare this report. It is also understood that the Greek soldiers performed the destruction in the villages in a systematic manner by orders coming from the center in the process of the war whose general panorama was drawn above. The authors of the report indicated that they accepted the offer to prepare the report by considering that preparing the report would not hinder their aid work for the orphans that they had been performing along with the Turkish Red Crescent. We understand that although the Ankara Government, which wanted to announce to the world public opinion that the Greek Army was withdrawing from the occupied places by destroying the villages after their defeat by the Turkish Army, attempted to announce the destruction to various centers by the reports that it had prepared, it also believed that it would be more effective if persons from an impartial country report the destruction. The very influential report prepared by two American women, who were close friends of Halide Edip, regarding the Greek atrocities in seven villages of Sivrihisar is one of the methods that the Ankara Government employed to make its rightful claims heard by the world opinion. As we may see in the details of the report, the systematic destruction in the villages of Sivrihisar is the continuation of a series of destructions that took place in western Anatolia. When we look at the issue from the perspective of historical continuity, the reported atrocities are like the scary continuation of the atrocities performed by the Greek Army against the Turks, which started in the Morea in 1821. There is almost no village or town, which did not get its share of the destruction committed by the Greek Army while it was withdrawing. İsmet İnönü stated this situation in his memoirs by noting down that the Greeks burned down the villages that they went without leaving anything behind. The destroyed confidence of the withdrawing Greek soldiers made them act with anger and hatred from a mental perspective without knowing what and why they were doing hundreds of kilometers away from their homes. Moreover, as the irregular withdrawal upset all of the food-supply order, the Greek soldiers experienced hunger, thirst and fear of being captured and they had to leave their heavily injured friends behind, and the war turned into a total disaster for them.⁹³ Even if there was no justification, the destruc-

93 For a detailed examination, see: Nilüfer Erdem, *Yunan Tarihçiliği'nin Gözüyle Anadolu Harekati*

tion of the houses took place due to a reason such as “applying the given orders” as it may be seen in the testimonies of the villagers and with this psychological anger. The interesting part of the report is that the genocide in Anatolia, which was not mentioned in many Western newspapers at the time, reached to names such as Winston Churchill among the British authorities. Therefore, an important attempt to announce the Greek atrocities in the world public opinion is an important record to understand and perceive history correctly.

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